Introduction
During the 2007/08 financial crisis, public-sector capital was frequently used as a failsafe to prevent the collapse of systemically relevant financial institutions. Increased government debt levels, disgruntled tax payers and a distortion of bankers' economic incentives were the ultimate consequences of such support mechanisms. Contingent convertible debt securities, or CoCo bonds, have been regarded as an innovative remedy to mitigate the possibility of a financial institution's default. By automatically being written down or converting into equity capital in the event of certain pre-defined triggers, these hybrid securities ameliorate an entity's capital position at critical times. CoCo bonds have enjoyed interest from both regulators and bank managers since their conceptual creation.
In many jurisdictions adopting Basel III, CoCo bonds can be used as core capital to meet regulatory requirements. The advent of the CoCo bond and the concomitant discussions of a "bail-in" could be seen as marking a shift in the way regulators plan to treat destabilized financial institutions in the future. While the announcement effects of conventional convertible securities on issuer stock prices have been widely discussed, research on the announcement effects of contingent convertible bonds that are issued by banking institutions is still absent. Our study fills this gap in the literature and investigates both the abnormal stock price and credit default swap spread reactions to the announcement of CoCos. We make use of a sample of 34 international banks and 87 distinct CoCo bond issues with a total nominal issue volume of around 80 billion USD. As such, we capture a significant portion of this new security market. Following the standard methodology of Brown and Warner (1985) and Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) , we conduct an event study that investigates the reactions of the CoCo bond issuers' stock prices and CDS spreads in the immediate post-announcement period.
Empirical research on conventional convertible debt securities suggests a negative relationship between an announcement and the post-announcement abnormal stock returns of the issuing entities. Duca, Dutordoir, Veld, and Verwijmeren (2012) report significant negative announcement effects of convertible offerings for firms in the United
States between 1984 and 2008. Earlier studies, such as those by Dann and Mikkelson (1984) , Billingsley and Smith (1996) , Mikkelson and Partch (1986) , and Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (1999) find similar results 2 . The event study results of De Roon and Veld (1998) show positive, yet insignificant announcement effects of convertible bond issues in the Dutch market. Burlacu (2000) finds negative effects in France; Ammann, Fehr, and Seiz (2006) in Germany and Switzerland. Overall, the negative announcement effects of convertible securities are mostly explained as resulting from the negative signal the issues send to incumbent equity owners. For a more detailed discussion on this issue, see Wallace, Glascock, and Schwarz (1995) , Stein (1992), or De Spiegeleer, Schoutens, and van Hulle (2014) .
Unlike the above-mentioned studies, we find that CoCo bonds have a positive announcement effect on stock prices. Moreover, we find that the CDS spreads of the institutions in our sample narrow significantly in the immediate post-announcement period. Our analysis shows that the sample banks´ announcement of a contingent convertible bond is, on average, correlated with a +1.0% cumulative abnormal stock return on the days t0 and t+1. The inclusion of an issuer call provision in the bond structure reverts the positive price effect. Both stock price and CDS effects are more pronounced for firsttime issues (i.e., when the issuing institution has no CoCo securities outstanding yet). We postulate that these effects are driven by a bank reducing its probability of default, on the one hand, and by the CoCos' positive signal and cost advantage over equity on the other.
In the past, many banks were saved in times of crisis by government intervention. The recent financial crisis, however, has highlighted the moral hazard implications of explicit or implicit bailout guarantees. Public pressure, motivated in no small part by costs taxpayers were forced to burden, has reduced the future likelihood of a bailout. Particularly when the bank retires existing debt for CoCo bonds, the relative protection of remaining creditors is stronger. This creditor protection should be expressed in a narrowing of an issuer's CDS spreads.
Secondly, CoCos have an advantage over equity in terms of funding costs and the signal they send to equity investors. An entity that issues CoCo bonds may treat these as constituting core capital, despite the debt classification of those instruments.
An institution's direct alternative, assuming it needs to increase its capital base, would be to issue equity. Pecking order theory, as developed by Myers and Majluf (1984) , stipulates, however, that equity is the least preferred source of financing for an entity in need of capital. A number of empirical studies that followed their theoretical work find negative stock price reactions to the announcements of equity issues (e.g., Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Barclay and Litzenberger, 1988; Masulis and Korwar, 1986; or Spiess and AffleckGraves, 1995 ; only to mention a few). Those studies argue that equity issues are a negative signal for investors due to asymmetric information. CoCos, however, are debt instruments that are convertible only under certain distress conditions. Therefore, they rank higher in the pecking order. If an issuer uses a CoCo bond to raise new capital, it implicitly takes a decision against the alternative, which is the issuance of common equity. If market participants anticipate that the bank must increase its capital due to regulatory requirements, and know it can do so either by issuing equity or CoCos, the announcement of a CoCo issue can be a positive signal to investors.
Lastly, CoCo bonds enjoy favorable tax treatment in many jurisdictions. In fact, Avdjiev, Kartasheva, and Bogdanova (2013) estimate that approximately 64% of CoCos outstanding in mid-2013 have tax-deductible coupons. This tax shield lowers funding cost and gives CoCos a cost advantage over common equity. A bank's decision of issuing
CoCos is therefore a decision of whether to make use of this tax shield effect or not.
Previous studies have shown that the value of such tax shields can be substantial (e.g., see Cooper and Nyborg, 2008; Graham, 2000; Kemsley and Nissim, 2002; or Van Binsbergen, Graham and Yang, 2010) . Schepens (2015) furthermore argues that it can be used as an important regulatory instrument, given its impact on a bank's capital structure choice. If market participants anticipate that the bank must increase its capital due to regulatory requirements and know it can do so by taking advantage of the tax shield (CoCos) or not (equity), then the CoCo announcement can be positive news to investors.
The observation that the announcement effects are more pronounced for first-time issues can be explained by the new information about the strategy of the institution, signaling that, with some probability, further issues of CoCos are forthcoming (in lieu of equity issues) in order to meet the increased capital requirements of the future 3 .
Our research contributes to two strands of the literature. Firstly, it complements the corporate finance research on abnormal stock returns around announcement dates of hybrid debt securities. As CoCo bonds are a recent development, we add novel information to this particular field. Secondly, our paper adds to the banking literature on market perceptions of a financial institution's risk structure.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the design and the general architecture of CoCo bonds. It further describes the dataset in detail and outlines the employed methodology. Section 3 shows the empirical results while section 4 concludes the main findings.
3 Even institutions that are too-big-to-fail no longer enjoy blanket protection from the state. In Switzerland (an early adopter of Basel III rules), for instance, financial institutions deemed to be of systemic relevance must create a "living will" (FINMA, 2011) . This living will, developed with the regulator, ensures the survival of the important functions while allowing the rest of the bank to be liquidated. While this may prove complex in practice, it nevertheless indicates that equity holders and bondholders no longer enjoy outright protection, no matter the size of the institution. in our analysis below, our study offers a contribution to this discussion.
Data
The market for contingent capital is relatively young. CoCo bonds have also been issued by financial institutions other than banks, such as insurance companies or other specialized financial services providers. However, since regulatory requirements and risk structures of other financial services firms might be different and difficult to compare cross-sectionally, we deliberately exclude their securities from our analysis. We focus solely on banking institutions with SIC-Codes: 6000-6159. For the empirical analysis, we furthermore exclude securities for three reasons: Firstly, we remove those issues for which the announcement date is not clearly defined. Secondly, we remove those issues for which announcement information has been released in connection with other company-specific information 6 . Thirdly, we exclude those securities for which no issuer stock price data was available for the period t-300 to t+30, whereby t0 denotes the convertible debt announcement date. Finally, for most analyses, we exclude issues that follow too closely upon one another so that abnormal stock returns cannot be computed. For the analysis of the announcement effects on CDS spreads, it is necessary to reduce the final sample further due to the limited availability of traded 5-year senior credit default swaps. We define the announcement date to be the day on which the information about the convertible debt security issue is made publicly available by an ad-hoc press release.
The announcement must include a precise statement of the issue volume and trigger mechanism to be included in the sample. Issue dates are defined as those dates on which the securities are ultimately offered to investors. Those particular dates are disclosed in the securities' offering memoranda. XXXXX 7 Securities that have been issued in other currencies than the US dollar have been converted into US dollar based on the exchange rate prevailing on their individual issue dates.
Descriptive statistics
Applying the filter criteria as described above, our final sample includes 87 contingent convertible securities that have been issued by 34 international banking corporations during the period between 1 January 2009 and 30 June 2014. The announcements were released on 55 different dates. Table 2 .3.1 reports the detailed summary statistics of the features of the securities that are included in our final sample. HHHH Regarding the loss absorption mechanism, our data indicates that there is no predominant type on the market. The fraction of securities (by issue volume) with an equity conversion mechanism is around 44.7%, whereas the remainder is structured with full or partial principal write-down provisions. The principal write-downs are either temporary or permanent, whereby most CoCo bonds with write-down provisions make use of full and permanent write-downs. 8 As measured in US dollar terms.
Of the 87 securities in our final sample, 16 have a CET1/RWA trigger level of exactly 5.125% 9 . Those account for approximately one fourth of the total accumulated issue volume of all sample CoCos and about half of the securities that qualify as AT1 capital. Our data also indicates that the amount of CoCo bonds with such triggers has been steadily increasing since 2009. This has already been documented by Avdjiev et al. (2013) , who explain this trend by both the increased capital requirement under the Basel III regime and the relative cost advantage over contingent convertible securities with higher trigger levels.
From a theoretical point of view, the issuance of high-trigger CoCos should be more expensive than the issuance of lower-trigger CoCos since the former lead to an earlier loss absorption by the bond holders in the case of conversion. Our data partly supports this hypothesis. However, while we do control for the trigger levels in the multivariate analysis in section 3.5, we do not aim to explain the factors affecting CoCo bond funding costs at issuance.
It should finally be noted that our sample is relatively heterogeneous in terms of the bond-issuing financial institutions. This pertains particularly to the geographical distribution and reach, the entities' balance sheet sizes as well as their target markets.
Moreover, they differ fundamentally in terms of their credit risk structures, as indicated by the dispersed cross-sectional distribution of the long-term issuer credit ratings and the large standard deviation of the CDS spread levels at the time of the CoCo bond issue dates.
Unfortunately, CDS information is only available for 24 sample banks; all CDS analyses are consequently performed on a sub-sample. Of these, the great majority had an S&P longterm issuer rating in the A or BBB category, with no institution having a credit rating below BB+ at the time of its CoCo bond announcement. The highest issuer credit rating prevailing on an announcement date was AA-. This rating was assigned to 3 institutions in the sample. were not in dire need of additional capital (as indicated by relatively high tier 1 ratios).
Results found in this paper are therefore not driven by underperforming banks reducing their shortcomings. BSSIZE is the balance sheet size of an entity as measured by the amount of total assets that is disclosed in the annual report of the year prior to the year of the debt security issuance. ISSUETIME is the time span between the announcement date and the issue date. MATURITY is the maturity of the dated CoCo securities included in our sample. CALLTIME is the time span between the issue date and the first possible call date after issuance of those bonds that include a call provision for the issuer. VOLATILITY is the historical volatility of the issuers' stock prices in the estimation window period TES = [t-110; t-11] . COUPON is the nominal coupon rate of the hybrid debt securities.
CDS is the issuers' senior 5-year credit default swap spread level on day t0. ∆CDS(+3) is the difference of the issuers' senior 5-year CDS spread between day t+3 and t0 as measured in basis points. 
Methodology
To measure the announcement effects of contingent convertible bond issues on stock returns, we conduct an event study following the standard methodology as proposed by Brown and Warner (1985) and Campbell et al. (1997) . In the first stage, we define abnormal stock returns based on predictions from a linear market model. We choose various MSCI country financial stock indices as market proxies, thereby controlling for both countrylevel and industry-sector effects. We define the estimation window as TES = [tx; ty] 10 , where x < y < 0 and t0 denotes announcement date. We estimate the abnormal returns for the period TEV = [t-10; t+20] 11 with t0 TEV and TEV ⊄ TES. We compute the abnormal returns in the period before and after the CoCo bond announcement day for various event windows denoted as τEV, whereby τEV ⊂ TEV. With the above-set specification, the estimation window and the event window do not overlap, as recommended by MacKinlay (1997) , so that the parameter estimates are not influenced by the returns around the event date.
We aggregate the abnormal returns in a second step and thereby continue to follow the approach as proposed by Campbell et al. (1997) . We compute the cross-sectional means of the banks' abnormal stock returns on specific days within the event window TEV (MARs)
as well as the average cumulative abnormal returns (MCARs) of all securities for certain event window ranges τEV = [ta; tb], where a < b. To draw inferences, we test the null hypothesis that the announcement events 12 do not have any impact on the abnormal stock returns, or, put differently, that MCAR is equal to zero using
10 To test for robustness, we compute the market model factor loadings for different estimation window ranges by varying the x and y parameters. The empirical results of those robustness tests are comprehensively described in section 3.4 of this paper. 11 Event window lengths are also varied for comparative purposes in section 3. 12 We additionally test issue-date effects in the same manner (see Appendix).
To test for statistical significance, we employ the approach as suggested by Fields and Mais (1991) who test statistical significance based on standardized abnormal returns. The assumption is that abnormal returns are multivariate normal and independent. We therefore test the null hypothesis that the average abnormal return is zero. We compute
where ARit are abnormal returns of bank i for date t and SDiT denotes the standard deviation of the sum of the ARit series over the time period τEV as computed in Fields and Mais (1991) .
In addition to abnormal stock price reactions, we also investigate the sample banks' abnormal credit default swap spread changes. We therefore employ an index-adjustment model as defined by Norden and Weber (2004) with the modifications of Hull, Predescu, and White (2004) . Daily index values are computed as the equally weighted cross-sectional mean of all sample CDS spreads for a particular rating category. Index levels were constructed for the two S&P issuer rating categories 1) AAA-A and 2) BBB and lower. To test whether spread changes are significantly different from zero, we apply cross-sectional parametric t-tests. For liquidity reasons, the 5-year CDS mid-spreads on the senior US dollar denominated underlying are included in our study 13 .
13 For some few institutions who had no US-dollar denominated debt outstanding, we employ the 5-year senior unsecured Euro-denominated CDS. We analyze the unconditional mean returns (MR) for the days following the announcement date. Subsequently, we compute the mean abnormal returns (MARs) over all bank stocks for all days t-2 to t+10. The abnormal returns are the differences between model predictions (based on the estimation period) and observed returns. In a second step we compute the mean cumulative return (MCR) as well as the mean cumulative abnormal returns (MCARs) for all stocks i for various event window lengths before and after the announcement date t0. We find that the returns of bank stocks following the announcement of a CoCo bond issue are, on average, positive. Importantly, we find that the mean abnormal returns are significantly positive on the day of the announcement, insinuating that the equity market appreciates the CoCo emission. As can be seen in Panel 1 of Table 3 .1.1 returns are 0.31%-pts higher on the announcement day than predicted. While abnormal returns increase to 0.70%-pts on the subsequent day, the effect is no longer significant. Moreover, we find that cumulative abnormal returns, computed over windows that include the announcement day, are significantly positive. As can be seen in Panel 2 of the table below, the effect is more pronounced for shorter window lengths and dissipates somewhat as more time is allowed to pass and other factors influence returns. Mean cumulative abnormal returns range from 0.29%-pts for the two days t-1 and t0 to 1.01%-pts for the two days t0 and t+1. The effects are economically significant, representing large two-day returns. We furthermore find that the above effects are only present for the announcement date and not the issue date itself, implying that the market prices the effect at announcement. The above analysis is replicated for issue dates. Since the time span between a CoCo bond's announcement and issue date is in some cases very short (for some securities announcement and issue dates even fall on the same day), we define a new sub-sample and exclude those CoCo bonds for which this time span is less than two days (9 issues excluded). This exclusion will ensure that the issue effect is not absorbed by the announcement effect. Exhibit 2 (Appendix) shows the results. 
Announcement effects: Abnormal CDS spread reactions
To examine potential effects of contingent capital announcements on the issuing entities' credit default swap spread changes, we furthermore investigate the banks' abnormal CDS spread reactions before and after the CoCo bond announcement dates.
In a first step, we predict the abnormal CDS spread changes with the rating index model, as described in section 3.3. To draw inferences from those predictions, we aggregate the abnormal changes and test them for statistical significance. Results are shown in Table   3 .2.1. HHHYASDF issue. The slower reaction of CDS markets is slightly surprising, though the effect magnitude remains significant from an economic perspective at 5 bps. However, it appears that the effect is more pronounced for equity holders than for creditors. In order to disentangle the effects for initial and subsequent CoCo bond offerings, we again split the sample and investigate the spread changes within the sub-samples.
Extension -Initial vs. subsequent CoCo bond offerings
Our empirical results from section 3.1 point to a significant positive announcement effect on both unconditional and abnormal stock returns. However, from a theoretical perspective, it is conceivable that the effect is stronger for initial security offers than for subsequent offerings, as described above.
In order to disentangle the announcement effects for initial and subsequent CoCo bond offerings on abnormal stock returns, we create two new sub-samples: The first subsample (SS1) includes only announcements of initial security offerings, whereas the second sub-sample (SS2) includes only announcements of subsequent security offerings. If an institution in our sample has announced only one CoCo bond during the period January 2009 to June 2014, the announcement is included solely in the first sub-sample (SS1).
Results are shown in Tables 3.3 .1 and 3.3.2. TTTTT amounting to 1.25%-pts, 1.22%-pts, and 2.95%-pts, respectively. While the mean cumulative abnormal return impact of subsequent offers is still positive in the short term (between 0.5 and 0.6%-pts), they are no longer significant. 
Robustness tests
The MAR and MCAR results described above are robust to changes in the length of the estimation window. We compute the results for 50-, 75-, and 120-day TES periods. In all three alternative calibrations, we find a significant positive announcement effect on day t0
as well as in the event window τEV [t0; t+1] . The change in the estimation windows does not change the factor loadings, nor does it alter the average R2 or the out-of-sample root mean squared errors of the market models markedly. We infer that the 90-day window is reasonably chosen. It should lastly be noted that alterations of the estimation window length change the sample slightly. To avoid including CoCo bond announcements in the estimation window, some observations, for banks that issue successive CoCos in relatively small time intervals, are dropped. Conversely, we include previously dropped observations when estimation windows are shortened. The fact that our results do not change supports the notion that our inferences are robust 15 . If we are less stringent with our sample cleaning procedure and include, for instance, issues that coincide with the release of other information, the magnitude of our results is diminished somewhat. This applies more strongly to the effect of abnormal stock returns than to CDS spread changes.
It is possible that the effect of stock price movements is highly sensitive to market perceptions that can be influenced by many factors.
Inferences in section 3.2 are also robust to changes of the rating index model. While we initially split the index into the two S&P issuer rating categories 1) AAA to A and 2) BBB and lower, we also compute the results for the total index. We still find CDS spread decreases for both total and initial CoCo bond announcements.
It should be noted that our analysis might suffer from a slight self-selection bias, as our CDS sub-sample includes only those banks for which senior 5-year credit default swaps were available. Those banks that do not have actively traded CDS outstanding are not taken into account, which might have implications on the inferential power of our results. It is furthermore noteworthy that although CDS spreads generally tend to react very fast to the advent of new information, it seems that this is not the case for the investigated contingent capital announcements in our sample. In fact, we do not find any statistically significant effect on the immediate bond announcement day (t0) or the day after (t1), neither for initial nor for all hybrid debt securities in our sample. The announcement 15 Similarly, excluding individual banks that issue several tranches of CoCos at once (i.e. Lloyds) does not change the results.
effect is rather lagged and most evident in the period 5 to 20 days following the announcement.
Multivariate analyses
In previous sections, we identified significant positive abnormal stock returns in the immediate period that follows the announcement dates of our sample CoCo bonds. While we control for country-specific effects in the analysis of stock price reactions and entityspecific effects in the CDS spread investigation, we have not yet examined the role of the bond-specific features. In order to identify the design characteristics of the contingent capital securities that might affect the abnormal stock returns, we now regress bondspecific factors on the observed MARs and MCARs (as computed in section 3.1 16 ). Those regressions take the following forms:
Since the size of a CoCo bond issue is likely to be connected with an issuer's postannouncement abnormal stock return, we include the variable BONDSIZE in our regression, where BONDSIZE is defined as the natural logarithm of the contingent capital security's face value over total capital at issuance as measured in US dollar terms 17 . Since 16 For econometric issues that might arise from only very few observations, we do not conduct a multivariate analysis for the abnormal CDS spread reactions. 17 If a bank has announced multiple CoCo bonds (or several CoCo bond tranches) on the same day, we take the aggregated notional value of all those securities. The face values that are issued in currencies other than the US dollar are converted in US dollars with the exchange rate prevailing on their respective issue date. Total capital is computed using last available data and represents size of the bank in the year prior to the issue. The data is winsorized at the 90 th percentile to avoid our results being driven by outliers; this slightly reduces the relative BONDSIZE for two banks but not the inferences discussed below. shows that the absolute values of the regressors' correlation coefficients are all below 0.5.
We find a moderate positive correlation between the variable REGCAP and TRIGGER (ϕ = +0.45), though this is to be expected. CoCo bonds that are classified as AT1 capital are more likely to have a trigger level of exactly 5.125%. Given the small sample size inherent to our analysis, standard errors are inflated to a certain extent. While we are cautious about our inferences, we still find that some of the above-mentioned factors exert a statistically significant influence. Results for the abnormal stock return analysis (MARs) for different days t before and after the announcement day t0 can be found in Table 3 .5.1. Additionally, We observe a significant negative coefficient for the variable BONDSIZE on day t+1 in Including a call provision reduces the cumulative abnormal returns by about 300 basis points. This observation is robust over different estimation windows 19 . A call provision enables the issuer to retract the bond in favor of cheaper sources of financing, typically at the issuers discretion. A call provision acts as a negative signal to counteract the positive effect of the issue itself; it may represent lacking commitment on the part of management as regards the purpose of the CoCo in avoiding bankruptcy. It is telling that the negative effect of a call signal is larger, in absolute magnitude, than the original average effect of the emission itself. Whether a bond can be considered Tier 1 capital is also associated with positive abnormal returns. This too follows from the logic of our above argumentation; the market values the bank´s ability of gaining additional Tier1 capital without issuing equity.
Finally TRIGGER is associated with longer-term positive MCARs, indicating that investors place value in CoCo bonds with relatively low financing costs. The persistence of the TRIGGER effect is particularly telling. 18 In subsequent days, the coefficient becomes positive. This reversal may indicate that, while a larger issue is associated with a lower announcement effect, it allows a bank to grow. 19 The explanatory power the multivariate model yet decreases for longer event window periods.
Conclusion
This paper investigates announcement effects of contingent convertible securities on stock returns and credit default swap spreads. For the CoCo issuers in our sample, we find significant positive abnormal stock price reactions and significant negative abnormal CDS spread changes in the immediate period following the announcement date. These reactions are more pronounced for first-time issuers. Call provisions reduce the size of the effect.
We explain the negative CDS spread reactions by the additional layer of protection that CoCo bonds offer to senior creditors. In the face of a changing regulatory framework that makes government-induced bail-outs less likely, the additional protection can be valuable in future years. Moreover, since CoCos also reduce the likelihood of an all-out default, the bankruptcy risk drops and the CDS spreads therefore narrow.
We explain the positive announcement returns of the banks' stocks by suggesting that the issue of a CoCo bond includes a positive signal for equity investors. The decision in favor of CoCos and against common equity (which ranks lower in the pecking order) might be positively received by market participants. Moreover, with CoCo bonds, a financial institution can exploit the tax shield effect that is associated with those hybrid debt securities. Anticipating that this effect might positively influence shareholder value, equity owners seem to interpret the issuance of CoCo bonds as a positive signal.
Exhibit 2: Abnormal stock returns around the CoCo bond issue date
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